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From San José to Karlsruhe, Strasbourg to New Delhi, in both the Global North and
South, judges have been at the forefront of the establishment of a new jus gentium
common to all humankind. Implicit in this narrative, however, lies the idea that
transnational judicial activism has inherent progressive outcomes: the rule of law,
human rights, or liberalism tout court are the necessary products of these new forms
of judicial communications. This implicit premise – which, unsurprisingly, responds to
the naiveté of the post-cold war era – cannot hold in an increasingly illiberal world.
Often, the usual illiberal response has been to confront courts – both national and
international – for their entanglement with the creation of the (neo)liberal “new
world order.” In my intervention at this symposium, I will argue that scholars of
courts and tribunals should heed to another illiberal reaction: using the discursive
tools invented by liberal internationalism to advance illiberal objectives. In a similar
way as Trump has used the legal toolkit of imperial “endless war” created by his
liberal predecessors, illiberal judges are now communicating with each other, and
embracing international law to further their agendas. The right has rediscovered its
own history: long before liberals and disgruntled socialists turned to judges to protect
human rights, courts had been a bulwark of the statu quo. The (in)famous Lochner
case before the US Supreme Court bears witness to the fact that Courts not only
have the potential to speak truth to power, but also, to speak power’s truth.
In this short blog piece, I will only provide a recap of my larger argument that I will
present at the upcoming conference on Cynical International Law. The paper (and its
full list of references) will be available upon request by any interested reader.
Constitutionalism and Judicialization in the Contemporary Cosmopolitan
Imagination
One common narrative in the history of the discipline is that the dark past of
selfishness, conflict, and bilateralism eventually was superseded by a bright present
in which cooperation, multilateralism, and peace shine, leading eventually to a future
of perpetual peace and good global governance. This narrative – which, following
David Kennedy, I will name the “Cosmopolitan Dream” – has often had a distinctively
“German” flair, insofar as it understands the field of international law through the
“vocabularies of public law,” be that administrative or constitutional law. For this
narrative, bridging this gap between the utopia of “community interest” and the crude
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apology of egoistic state-interest has been one of the founding traumas for our
discipline.
As the Berlin wall crumbled, cosmopolitan dreamers found themselves unshackled
from the iron cage of the cold war.  Suddenly, it seemed that the time for the
liberal international legal order – dreamt since 1945, 1873, or even 1648 – had
finally come. International law, at last, was going to progressively develop to new
heights. Thus, the nineties saw the emergence of a myriad of legal frameworks
and the proliferation of international courts and tribunals that attempted to set the
parameters for the global rule of law. For all of our past historical benchmarks and
geological foundations, contemporary international law truly began in the 1990s. The
events, characters, and trends before that are just history: confined to the past; sad
remnants of the struggles lost and won; a tragic inheritance of the limited success
and resounding failures of our forefathers.
Following Duncan Kennedy’s seminal piece on the Three Globalizations of Law, I
argue that we should understand the cosmopolitan dream as a form of (international)
legal consciousness.  This cosmopolitan consciousness – which was forged
in the crucible of this “age of global optimism” – came to determine the scope
and parameters of contemporary legal thought in international law. In fact, the
cosmopolitan dream should be understood in the backdrop of Kennedy’s third
globalization, which began in 1945, accelerated in the 70s, but only came into full
speed in the 90s. And, as Tomlins has aptly shown, this third globalization should
be studied as the adaptation of legal parole to the rise of neoliberal economics as a
hegemonic horizon in – and beyond – legal consciousness.
As this blog entry does not offer us a space to fully review the connecting veins
between neoliberalism and (international) law in contemporary legal consciousness,
I will merely review two twin stars which have guided contemporary cosmopolitan
imagination: constitutionalism and judicialization. Most of the existing literature on
judicial dialogue and strategic human rights litigation cannot be understood without
reference to the magnetic field created by these two poles. They have shaped our
expectations, hopes, and aspirations when it comes to transnational judicial activism.
Constitutionalism and judicialization were products of the zeitgeist of liberal
hegemony, in a period marked by high hopes on the promises of law and rights
in contemporary global governance. Sadly, the days in which we could assume
that judges and courts would always be staunch allies for liberal causes are long
gone (if they were ever here). As the tide turns, however, and the (neo)liberal
consensus crumbles, there seems little space left to the legal transnational advocacy
networks (TANs) that promoted litigation. Provocatively, I would like to suggest
that TANs might be at their best a powerless companion to neoliberal politics, and
at their worst perhaps part of the problem. These networks are merely part of a
wider approach of center-left responses to globalization: what I would like to call
the Academic-NGO-Courts Complex. According to this strategy, law is the best – if
not the only – instrument for social change, and must be mobilized from the Courts,
the Classrooms, and Civil Society. But, as the rising populist Right create their own
NGOs, purges law schools, and packs the courts, one can only wonder if TANs
can still count that the “right people” with the “right biases” will still be in place when
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their day in court finally comes. As Goya reminds us, the sleep of reason produces
monsters. And now, as Gramsci once said, “the old world is dying, and the new
world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.”
Francisco Goya. El sueño de la razón produce monstrous [the sleep of
reason produces monsters] (1791-1799). Aguatinta sobre papel – Museo
del Prado (Madrid, Spain).
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The Sleep of Reason produces Monsters: Backlash(es) against International
Law
As it is well known, liberal juristocracy is a highly contentious issue, and is not
without its discontents. Critics argue that a board of unelected judges cannot take
highly political decisions and should defer to the democratic legitimacy of the
executive power or of parliament. This line of critique only carries more weight
when applied to international judges, who are often seen even more far away from
the “people” they are regulating.  The government of judges – even in the name
of the rule of law – has often been accused of suffering from a democratic deficit.
Benvenisti attempted to argue that judges are actually “reclaiming democracy” in
a highly globalized world, instead of taking it away from the people or the other
branches of government. Despite his pleas, voters all around the world have been
unconvinced, revolting against national and international courts. The recent – and
unsuccessful – attempt in Switzerland to block “foreign” judges is but the latest case
of a long trail of illiberal denunciation of transnational judicial dialogue.
This illiberal response is all too well known for international lawyers: it is now an
established genre of contemporary scholarship: backlash(es). When the illiberal
revolt started years ago in the backyard of Empire, Eastern Europe and Latin
America, it didn’t seem to trouble international lawyers at the core. Cosmopolitan
dreamers, avid readers of Rawl’s Law of Peoples, simply dismissed this as the
immature tendencies of the indecent, non-liberal peoples and their outlaw states.
However, when in 2016, the populist revolt came home to the Northern Atlantic (with
Brexit in the UK and Trump’s election in the US), international lawyers quickly came
to terms with the far right’s challenge against the cosmopolitan imagination. From the
age of global optimism, we found ourselves in the age of global anger.
Under siege, most international lawyers decided to strike back. Framing the issue
as a matter of us (the cosmopolitan dreamers) vs. them (the backward nationalist
populists), lawyers have turned to litigation to defend the rule of law, seeing the
populist revolt as merely a setback. Perhaps their manifesto is Koh’s Trump and
International Law, which highlights the many ways in which the “resistance” is
winning over Trump. Another clear example can be found in Ginsburg’s recent
Lauterpacht Memorial lectures, where he posited the dichotomy between we, the
democratic internationalists vs. them, the authoritarian Westphalians.
Sadly, international lawyers have focused so much on this typical illiberal strategy
and on the dichotomy us-good vs. them-bad, that we have paid scant attention
to another possible avenue for backlash: using the discursive tools invented by
liberal internationalism to advance illiberal objectives. More often than not, illiberal
governments have understood that instead of attacking courts, they might as
well pack them. The career of judge (and now Minister) Sergio Moro in Brazil, for
instance, is a clear example of how illiberals can use the judiciary as a weapon
in their favor. In other words, contrary to cosmopolitan assumptions, the tools,
discourses, and doctrines by liberal constitutionalism can further agendas which,
in principle, seem to contradict the lofty dreams of the 90s. Perhaps the dreamers
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will soon find themselves in a nightmare of abusive constitutionalism and illiberal
judicialization in global governance.
Abusive constitutionalism in International Law: Trump’s “Commission on
Unalienable Rights”
Let me refer to only one example of this growing trend. Recently, the Trump
Administration created a new Commission on Unalienable Rights, which has the
purpose of advising the Secretary of State on “international human rights matters.”
According to its Charter (which has been credited to Robert George, a conservative
law professor who recently co-edited the Cambridge Companion to Natural Law),
this commission has the task to “provide fresh thinking about human rights and
[propose] reforms for human rights discourse where it was departed from our
nation’s founding principles of natural law and natural rights.” Surprisingly, I must
here agree with (Eric) Posner’s affirmation that this Commission plays a crucial
role in the Trump administration’s attempt to reinterpret international human rights
law under the lens of conservative religious natural-law thinking. In particular,
liberal commentators are worried that this Commission would use rights (or, to
paraphrase its Charter, rights discourse) against sexual and reproductive rights, or
transgender rights, or sexual equality. As Mégret aptly noted, “[p]erhaps nothing is
more misleading than the Dworkinian image of rights as trumps.” Rather, unalienable
rights could be mobilized to expand the power of the state and crush the already
limited space of women and sexual minorities in – and beyond – the US.
In a recent debate on the future of strategic human rights litigation, Wolfgang Kaleck
suggested that human rights activist needed to politicize their struggle. Moyn, along
these lines, has already issued a similar call to action, inviting human rights to
“descend into the world as language of contest and struggle.” Sadly, cosmopolitan
dreamers insist “keeping calm and carry on” lawyering as usual, with their “radically
moderate approach.” While Rome burns, the cosmopolitans have not started to
question the role of perils of judges as instruments of illiberal global governance.
The right, however, has rediscovered its own history, and is willing to embrace (and
politicize) human rights, constitutionalism, and judicialization in their own image.
And now, to remember Bob Dylan, the times they are a changin’, we don’t need a
weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing.
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